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Evidence from a Randomized Experiment 

We estlmate  how  cost  sharing  the portion  of  the bill  the patieilt  pajs,  ufects 
the demand for  medicul sercices.  The data come from  a rundomi:ed  e-uperiment. 
A  cutustrophic  insurance plan  reduces  expenditures 31 percent  relutice  to zero 
out-of-pocket price.  The price  elasticity  is upproxirrzutel~ - 0.2.  We reject  the 
hypothesis that less fucoruble  coverage of outpatient sercices increases total expen- 
diture (for example, bj)  deterring precentice  care or inducing hospitu1i:ution). 
Over  the past  four decades  medical  care 
costs have grown about 4 percent per year in 
real terms, and the share of  GNP devoted to 
medical care has increased from 4.4 percent 
in  1950  to  10.7  percent  in  1985  (Daniel 
Waldo, Katherine Levit, and Helen Lazenby, 
1986). A prominent explanation of  this rapid 
increase has emphasized the spread of  health 
insurance, which has generated  demand for 
both a higher quality and an increased quan- 
tity  of med~cal  services  (Martin  Feldstein, 
1971,  1977). In  turn,  the  spread  of  health 
insurance has been linked to the exemption 
of employer-paid health insurance premiums 
from  the  individual  income  tax  (Feldstein 
and  Elizabeth  Allison,  1974; Feldstrin and 
Bernard Friedman, 1977; Mark Pauly, 1986). 
Thus,  the  increase  in  expenditure  is  often 
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portrayed  as  a  type  of  market  failure  in- 
duced  by  public  policy,  although  such  an 
argument is not universally accepted (Morris 
Barer, Robert Evans, and Gregory Stoddart, 
1979; Robert  Evans,  1984; John Goddeeris 
and Burton Weisbrod, 1985). 
No  one  has  shown,  however,  that  the 
spread of  health insurance can quantitatively 
account  for  most  of  the  sustained  rise  in 
health  expenditure (Pauly, 1986). If  it  can- 
not,  the  widespread  presumption  that  dis-
torted  prices  (because of  insurance) are in- 
ducing  excess  resources  in  medical  care  is 
not necessarily correct. Central to appraising 
the quantitative role of  insurance, of  course, 
is the magnitude of  the demand response to 
changes in insurance. The literature exhibits 
substantial  disagreement, by  a  factor of  10 
or  more,  about  the  price  elasticity,  or 
coinsurance  elasticity,  of  demand  (Richard 
Rosett  and  Lien  Fu  Huang,  1973;  Karen 
Davis  and  Louise  Russell,  1972;  Charles 
Phelps and Newhouse, 1974; Fred Goldman 
and  Michael  Grossman,  1978;  Ann  Colle 
and Grossman, 1978; Newhouse and Phelps, 
1974, 1976).' 
Such disagreement is not surprising in light 
of  the  problems  of  using  nonexperimental 
data  to  estimate  elasticities  (Newhouse, 
he  elasticit\  estimates  at  the  mean  \an from 
around -0 1 to  2 1 752  THE  A!MERICA:V  FCO:VO.MIC  REVIEW'  JL'h'E 1987 
Phelps,  and  Marquis,  1980).  In  cross-sec-
tional data, insurance  is endogenous;  those 
who expect to demand more services have a 
clear  incentive  to obtain more complete in- 
surance, either by selecting a more generous 
option at the place of  employment, by work- 
ing  for  an  employer  with  a  generous  in-
surance  plan,  or  by  purchasing  privately 
more generous coverage. 
Ignoring this  selection  issue (i.e., treating 
insurance  as exogenous) has  generally  pro- 
duced  results  showing  that  demand  for 
medical  care responds  to insurance-induced 
variation in price. Treating insurance as en- 
dogenous,  however,  has  generally  led  to 
coefficients with confidence intervals that are 
insignificantly different from zero at conven- 
tional levels (Newhouse and Phelps, 1976).' 
That upward  bias may  be  present  is sug- 
gested by results from several natural experi- 
ments that  compared demands of  the same 
individuals before  and after their  group  in- 
surance changed (Anne Scitovsky and Nelda 
Snyder, 1972; Scitovsky and Nelda McCall, 
1977;  Phelps  and  Newhouse,  1972;  R.  G. 
Beck,  1974). In  these  cases  the  change  in 
insurance  is  presumptively  exogenous,  and 
the elasticity  estimates cluster near  the low 
end of  those cited above. But natural experi- 
ments  have  no  control  group,  so  that  any 
other factor  that  changed  over  time is per- 
fectly confounded with the insurance change. 
Moreover,  the  samples  available  in  such 
studies are not necessarily  representative of 
the general  population,  and  the  changes  in 
insurance that could be studied were limited 
to those that occurred in the natural experi- 
ment.  Hence,  these  results  too  have  been 
s~spect.~ 
'~lthough  many believe this failure to reject  the null 
hypothehis  when  insurance  is  treated  as  endogenous 
occurs  because  the  insurance  variable  is  only  weakly 
identified, the magnitude of  any upward bias in elastic- 
ity estimates  from treating insurance as exogenous  re- 
mains unknown. Hausman (or Wu) type tests have not 
been  used  to test  for endogencity. but if  they  failed  to 
reject  the null hypothesis of  exogeneity. it could be  for 
lack  of  power  because  of  a  lack  of  a  useful  set  of 
instruments. 
3~or reweus of  the nonexperimental demand litera- 
ture and a discussion  of  its  methodological  problems. 
see Neuhouse (1978: 1981). 
In light of  the uncertainty  about how de- 
mand responds to insurance-induced changes 
in price, and the importance for both public 
and private decisions of  quantifying that re- 
sponse, the federal government initiated  the 
Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) in 
1974, one aim of which was to narrow uncer- 
tainty about this issue (Newhouse, 1974). In 
this article we  report the  results  of  that ex- 
periment. Our findings have implications for 
the role of  insurance in explaining the post- 
war increase in medical expenditure, as well 
as for the magnitude of  the welfare loss from 
health insurance. 
The HIE had several obiectives other than 
improved  estimates  of  how  demand  re-
sponds  to  insurance.  Four  such  objectives 
merit mention here: 
1) Many  poor  individuals  are  insured 
through  public  programs;  whether  the  de- 
mand response differs for the poor is there- 
fore  an issue  in  decisions  onthe scope of 
these programs. 
2) Insurance need not be uniform across 
various medical services. In fact. second-best 
pricing implies that coverage should be more 
generous  for  less  price  elastic  (or less  in- 
surance  elastic)  services  (Frank  Ramsey, 
1927;  Richard  Zeckhauser.  1970;  William 
Baumol  and  David  Bradford,  1970).  We 
therefore  wished  to  learn  if  insurance  elas- 
ticities differed for various  types of  medical 
services.  In  particular.  are -demand  elas-
ticities  greater  for outpatient physician  ser-
vices, psychotherapy, and preventive services. 
whch  would  accord  with  the  observed 
lesser coverage of  these  service^?^ 
3) The public financing of  medical care 
has  been justified  by  its  status  as  a  merit 
good (Richard Musgrave, 1959) and in par- 
ticular  the  claim  that  the  consum~tion  of 
medical  services  leads  to  improved  health, 
whch  can  generate  externalities  (Cotton 
Lindsay, 1969; Anthony Culyer, 1971, 1976, 
1978; Pauly,  1971; Evans,  1984). Thus, we 
40ther explanations, not mutually  exclusive.  for the 
lower coverage  of  these services include greater loading 
charges  and  asymmetric  information  between  insurer 
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sought  to  quantify  how  the  change  in  the 
consumption  of  medical  services  at  the 
margin  might  affect  health. The  answer  to 
this question would inform the political de- 
bate about the benefits of  public financing of 
medical  care  services  for  the  indigent  and 
would also inform the insurance decisions of 
private agents such as employers and unions. 
4)  For  the  past  decade,  public  policy 
has promoted  Health  Maintenance  Organi- 
zations  (HMOs) on  the  groups  that  such 
organizations were  more efficient in the de- 
livery  of  services.  Almost  all  evidence  of 
lower cost, however, came from uncontrolled 
settings, leaving unresolved  the  question of 
whether  selection  of  healthier  members  or 
more efficient  treatment was responsible  for 
lower  costs in  HMOs (Harold  Luft,  1981). 
Also unresolved was the question of  whether 
any true reduction in services at HMOs might 
adversely  affect  health  status. Therefore, we 
sought to decompose the observed lower use 
of  services  at one HMO into the pure effect 
of the HMO, on the one hand, and treating a 
possibly less sickly group of  enrollees on the 
other.  Moreover,  we  sought  to  determine 
whether any reduced use of  services affected 
health status and satisfaction. 
This article considers  the  first  two  ques- 
tions  in  some  detail  and  summarizes  the 
findings on the latter two. 
I.  Data and Sample 
A.  The Design of  the Rand Health 

Insurance Experiment 

Between  November  1974  and  February 
1977, the HIE enrolled  families in six 
Dayton'  Ohio;  Washington; 
burg, Massachusetts;  Mas-
sachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; and 
Georgetown County, South Car~lina.~ 
'~ewhouse  (1974) and  Robert Brook  et al.  (1979). 
provide  fuller  descriptions  of  the  design.  Newhouse 
et al.  (1979)  discuss  the  measurement  issues  for  the 
second  generation  of  social  experiments.  to  which  the 
HIE  belongs.  John  Ware  et al.  (1980)  discuss  many 
aspects of  data collection  and measurement for health 
status. 
he sites were selected to represent  the four census 
regions: to represent the range of  city sizes (a  proxy for 
Families  participating  in  the  experiment 
were assigned  to one of  14 different fee-for- 
service insurance plans or to a prepaid group 
practice;  additionally,  some  members  al-
ready enrolled in the prepaid group practice 
were enrolled  as a separate group. The fee- 
for-service  insurance  plans,  the  main  fo-
cus  of  this  article,  had  different  levels  of 
cost  sharing, whch varied over two  dimen- 
sions: the coinsurance rate (percentage paid 
out-of-pocket)  and  an  upper  limit  on  an-
nual out-of-pocket expenses. The coinsurance 
rates were 0, 25, 50, or 95 percent. Each plan 
had  an  upper  limit  (the  Maximum  Dollar 
Expenditure  or  MDE)  on  annual  out-of-
pocket  expenses of  5,  10, or  15 percent  of 
family income, up to a maximum of  $1,000.' 
Beyond the MDE, the insurance plan  reim- 
bursed all covered expenses in full. 
Covered  expenses  included  virtually  all 
medical  service^.^  One  plan  had  different 
coinsurance rates for inpatient and ambula- 
tory  medical  services  (25 percent)  than  for 
dental and ambulatory mental health services 
(50 percent). And on one plan, the families 
faced a 95 percent coinsurance rate for out- 
patient  services,  subject  to  a  $150  annual 
limit  on out-of-pocket  expenses per  person 
($450 per family). In ths plan, all inpatient 
services  were  free;  in  effect,  ths plan  had 
approximately  an outpatient individual de- 
d~ctible.~ 
the complexity of  the medical delivery system); to cover 
a range of  waiting times to appointment and physician 
per capita ratios (to test  for the  sensitivity of  demand 
elasticities to nonprice  rationing); and to include both 
urban and rural sites in the ~orth  and the South. 
he maximum was $750 in some site-vears for the 
25 percent coinsurance plans. The $1000 uYas  kept fixed 
in nominal dollars from 1974 to 1981. During this time 
the  medical  care  component  of  the  CPI  rose  by  96 
percent. 
'See  Lorraine Clasquin (1973) for a discussion of  the 
rationale for the HIE itructure of  benefits. Nonpreven- 
tive  orthodontia and cosmetic  surgery (related to pre- 
existing  conditions) were  not  covered.  Also  excluded 
were  outpatient psychotherapy  services in excess  of  52 
visits per year per person. In the case of  each exclusion. 
it  is  questionable  whether  anything  could  have  been 
learned  about  steady-state  demand  during  the  3- to 
5-year lifetime of  the experiment. 
he coinsurance rate for the 95 percent and individ- 
ual deductible plans was actually 100 percent in the first 2.54  TllE  A MERICA V CCOYO  MIC  RCC IEI.1  JL  VF-198' 
Families were assigned  to these insurance 
plans using  the Finite Selection Model (Carl 
Morris,  1979).  This  model  was  used  to 
achieve  as  much  balance  across  plans  as 
possible whlle retaining randomization;  that 
is,  it minimizes  the correlation between  the 
experimental  treatments  and  health,  demo- 
graphic, and economic covariates. 
To study  methods  effects,  the  HIE  em-
ployed  four  randomized  subexperiments 
(Newhouse  et al.,  1979).  We  describe  two 
here.  To test  for  transitory  demand  effects 
(Charles  Metcalf,  1973;  Kenneth  Arrow, 
1975), 70  percent  of  the  households  were 
enrolled  for three  years;  the  remainder  for 
five  years.  Also, to ensure that  no one was 
worse  off financially  from  participating  in 
the  study.  families  were  paid  a  lump  sum 
payment.'0 To test for a possible stimulus to 
utilization,  40  percent  of  the  families were 
given an unanticipated increase in their lump 
sum payment during the next to the last year 
of  the study. 
B.  The Sample 
The enrolled sample is for the most part a 
random sample of each site's nonaged popu- 
lation, but  some groups were  not eligible." 
!ear  of  Dayton, the first site. The rate was changed  to 
95 percent  for all other site-years of  the experiment. in 
order to increase the incentive  to file  claims,  although 
there was  no statistical evidence at that time of  under- 
filing.  Subsequent analysis  has  shown  that  the  mean 
outpatient  physician  expenditure  on  the  95  percent 
coinsurance plans relative to the free-care plan is under- 
stated  by  about  5  to  10 percent  because  of  a  lower 
propensity  to  file  claims  (William  Rogers  and  New-
house, 1985). 
"'~ecause  of  size of  the lump sum payment. there is 
a  theoretical  presumption  of  no bias  from  refusal  or 
attrition.  Although  refusal  and  attrition  occurred  at 
higher  rates  on higher  coinsurance plans.  refusal  and 
attrition appear to have been random withn plan. More 
precisely, we detect no differences by plan at enrollment 
in  pre-experimental  use  or  health  status,  nor  do we 
detect differences in the rate of  spending betueen those 
uho withdrew from the experiment  and those who did 
not  More detailed  data on issues  of  refusal  and  attri- 
tion  can  be found in  Brook  et al. (1983. 1984): Kevin 
O'Grady et al. (1985): Newhouse  et al. (1987). The de- 
tails  of  the lump sum payment  rules can be  found in 
Clasquin  and Marie Brown (1977). 
"The  ineligible groups include: 1) those 62 years of 
age  and older  at the time of  enrollment: 2) those with 
Table 1gives the sample by plan and site; it 
excludes the  1,982 persons in the HMO ex- 
periment. Note that plans are not perfectly 
balanced  by site;  in  particular, no one was 
enrolled  in  the  50  percent  plan  in  Seattle, 
and about  half  of  those  in  the  50 percent 
plan are in Dayton, whereas only 20 percent 
of  all participants are in Dayton.I2 
1.  Dependent  Variables.  In  the  interest  of 
brevity,  we  focus  primarily  on  the  use  of 
medical  services other  than  outpatient psy- 
chotherapy  and  dental  services.I3  We  do. 
however,  summarize  results  for  dental  ser-
vices below. 
incomes in excess of  $25.000 in 1973 dollars or $58.000 
in  1984 dollars); ths  excluded 3 percent of  the families 
contacted;  3)  those eligible  for the  Medicare disability 
program, 4) those in jails  or institutionallzed for indefi- 
nite  periods;  5) those  in  the  military  or  their  depen- 
dents: and 6) veterans with  service-connected  disabili- 
ties. 
bout 3 percent of  the actual participant-years are 
truncated  because  the  participant  w~thdrew  partway 
through  an  accounting  year.  With  the  exception  of 
deaths, u,e do not  use  such participants  in  the estima- 
tion  sample  because  the  4-part  model  (see  below) 
requires  equal  time  periods  for each  obsewation. If  a 
person  is  only  observed  for  one  quarter  and  the 
expenditure distribution is lognormal, the annual distri- 
bution is not simply the quarterly distribution scaled up 
by  a  factor  of  4:  i.e.. the  lognormal  di\tribution does 
not convolute.  The sample used  in  this  analysis  more 
specifically includes enrollees during each full year that 
they  participated. and  the  last  accounting year  in  the 
study for those who died. We excluded data on partial 
vears of  participation by  newborns. (Their expenses in 
the hospital at the time of  birth, however. are attributed 
to the mother.) We  tested  the  legitimacy of  excluding 
those with partial years by comparing expenditure rates 
of  part-year  persons.  adjusted  for  time  at  risk.  with 
what they would have spent if  they behaved like full-year 
people.  Specifically  we  regressed  actual  expenditure 
minus (time at risk  times the 4-part model  prediction) 
on plan dummy variables. We could not reject  the null 
hypothesis of  no difference by  plan  (,y2(4)  = 2.67.  p  > 
,513). The estimated  effect  of  including part-year  par- 
ticipants is to negligibly increase the estimated response 
to plan 
"See  Mannlng et a1  (1984b.  1986b) and  Kenneth 
Wells  et a1  (1982) for add~tlonal  results  on  the  use  of 
mental health  care, and  Manlung  et a1  (1985) for ad- 
dltlonal results on dental use  Mental health care use 1s 
on the order of  4 percent of  the expenditures discussed 
here -- 
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Site 
Estl-
Frank- Enroll- mation 
Fitch- lin  Charles- George- ment  Sample 
Plan  Dayton  Seattle  burg  County  ton  town  Totald  Totalb 
-
Free  301  431  241  297  264  359 
25 Percent'  260  253  125  152  146  201 
50 Percent  191  0  56  5  8  26  52 
95 Percent  280  253  113  162  146  166 
Indiv~dual 
Deduct~ble  105 
Total  1137 
"Persons. 

h~erson-years. 

'Includes  those with 50 percent coinsurance for dental and mental health and 25 precent coinsurance for all other 

services. 
2.  Independent  Variables. Although we  pre- 
sent sample means by plan, we  also present 
results controlling for site, health status, so- 
ciodemographic, and economic variables. 
Insurance  Plan  Variables.  Rather  than 
impose a functional form, we have conserva- 
tively  used  dummy variables  for  insurance 
plans. We have grouped the insurance plans 
into five  groups:  1) the  free plan  (noout- 
of-pocket cost  to the family);  2) 25 percent 
coinsurance rate plans for medical  services; 
3)  50  percent  coinsurance  rate  plans  for 
medical services:  4) 95  Dercent  coinsurance 
rate plans  for  medical  s'ervices; and 5)  the 
plan with  a 95 percent coinsurance rate for 
outpatient services (subject to a limit of  $150 
per person or $450 per  family per year) and 
free inpatient care.14 The middle three groups 
we call the family-pay plans. 
Other Couariates. In addition to dummv 
variables  for  each  plan  group, we  also  in- 
cluded  covariates for  age,  sex, race,  family 
income, health  status, family  size, and  site 
(Manning et al., 1987). With the exception of 
family  size  and income,  the data were col- 
14~ifferences among plans with 5, 10, and 15 percent 
upper  limits  are  too  small  to  detect  at  the  level  of 
annual expenditure. Hence, we have pooled across these 
different  expenditure ceilings.  See  Keeler  et al. (1987) 
for further discussion of  how  a  varying  ceiling  affects 
demand. 
lected before or at enrollment in the study. 
The  value  for  family  size  varies  by  year. 
Family income data are from 1975 in  Day- 
ton, 1978 for the three-year group in South 
Carolina.  and  1976  for  all  other  ~artic-
ipants.15 Health status measures are des'cribed 
more  fully  in  Brook  et al.  (1983,  1984), 
R. Burciaga Valdez et al. (1985), and Valdez 
(1986). 
Although we have not tested for all possi- 
ble  interactions  among  covariates,  we  did 
examine some that are important for policy 
purposes (for example, income and plan). As 
a  result,  we  have  included  interactions be- 
tween being a child and plan in the inpatient 
and  outpatient  use  equations  (see  below), 
between plan and income in the probabilities 
of  any use of  medical  and of  any inpatient 
use (see below), and between sex and age in 
all  equations.  The  remaining  interactions 
I5The first  year  of  participation  was  1975 for  the 
Dayton participants;  the South Carolina  3-year group 
began participation in late 1978 (about a quarter par- 
ticipated  for two months and  another quarter for one 
month  of  1978);  and  the  remainder  of  the  sample 
enrolled in 1976 or early 1977. Most of  the enrollment 
was  in  the  latter  half  of  1976.  We  used  these  data 
because  we  believed  the  income  measure  was  more 
reliable than the data on pre-experimental income. The 
data we used  were collected on forms keyed to income 
tax  returns, whereas  data on pre-experimental  income 
were responses to a personal interview. were neither significant nor appreciable, and 
have been omitted. 
C. Unit of Analvsis 
The unit of  analysis is a person-year. We 
use  the year  as the  time  frame for  ease of 
interpretation  and  because  the  upper  limit 
on out-of-pocket expenses is an annual limit. 
We use the person as the unit of  observation 
because most major determinants of  the use 
of  services  are individual (for example, age, 
sex,  and  health  status)  rather  than  family 
(for example, insurance coverage, and family 
income). 
11.  Statistical Methods 
We  estimated  two  types  of  models.  In 
addition to simple means (ANOVA), we pre- 
sent more robust estimates based on a four- 
equation  model  developed  by  Duan  et al. 
(1982  and  1983).  This  model  gains  over 
ANOVA  (and  ANOCOVA)  by  exploiting 
three  characteristics  of  the  distribution  of 
medical  expenses.  First,  a large  proportion 
of  the  participants use  no  medical  services 
during the year. Second, the distribution of 
expenses  among  users  is  highly  skewed. 
Third, the  distribution of  medical  expenses 
is  different  for individuals with  only outpa- 
tient use than for individuals with inpatient 
use. 
Because  of  these  three  characteristics, 
ANOVA (and ANOCOVA) yields imprecise, 
though consistent, estimates of  the effects of 
health insurance, health status, and socioeco- 
nomic status on the use of  medical services, 
even for a sample size on the order of 20,000 
(not all independent) observations. As Duan 
et al.  (1982  and  1983)  and  Manning  et al. 
(1987) show, a four-equation model that ex- 
ploits  the characteristics  of  the  medical  ex- 
pense distribution yields consistent estimates 
with lower mean square error than ANOVA. 
A.  The Four-Equation Model 
We  partition  the  participants  into  three 
groups:  nonusers,  users  of  only  outpatient 
services, and users of  any inpatient services. 
We  examine  the  expenses  of  the  last  two 
groups of  users sepatately. 
The first equation of  the model is a probit 
equation  for-the probability  that  a  person 
will  receive  any  medical  service during the 
year-from  either  inpatient  or  outpatient 
sources. Thus, ths equation  separates users 
from nonusers, and addresses the first char- 
acteristic described above, a large proportion 
of  the  population  does  not  use  medical 
services during the year.  The second  equa- 
tion is a probit equation for the conditional 
probability  that a user will have at least one 
inpatient stay, given that he has some medical 
use.  Thls  equation  separates  the  two  user 
groups,  and  thus  addresses  the  third  char- 
acteristic noted above, different distributions 
of  medical expenses for inpatient and outpa- 
tient users. 
The third  equation  is  a linear  regression 
for  the  logarithm  of  total  annual  medical 
expenses  of  the  outpatient-only users.  The 
fourth equation is a linear regression for the 
logarithm  of  total  annual medical  expenses 
for  the users  of  any inpatient service. Ths 
last  eauation  includes  both  out~atient  and 
inpatient expenses for users of  any inpatient 
services.16 
The logarithmic transformation  of  annual  u 

expenses practically  eliminates  the  undesir- 
able skewness in the distribution of  expenses 
among users, the second characteristic noted 
above:  In  particular,  the  logarithmic  trans- 
form  yields  nearly  symmetric  and  roughly 
normal  error  distributions.  Further  details 
are available in Duan et al. (1982 and 1983) 
and Manning et al. (1  987). 
While our use of  the four-equation model 
is  motivated  by our desire to have  the  sto- 
chastic  term  approximate  the  normal  as-
sumption  as  c~bsely  as possible  (to obtain 
robust estimates), the error distributions for 
the two levels of  expense equations still de- 
viate from the normal assumption. As  a re- 
lhGrouping  expenses by person rather than the more 
natural  all-inpatient  and  all-outpatient  expenditure 
eliminates the need  to account for across-equation cor- 
relation in calculating standard errors of  total expendi- 
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sult, if  we  were  to  use  the  normal  theory 
retransformation  from the logarithmic scale 
to the raw dollar scale (exp(a2/2)),  the pre- 
dictions  would  be  inconsistent.  Instead  we 
use a nonparametric estimate of  the retrans- 
formation  factors,  the  smearing  estimate, 
developed  by  Duan  (1983),  which  in  this 
application  is the sample average of  the ex- 
ponentiated least squares residuals: 
where 	 n,  = sample size for equation j, 
e~~(x,~~)4,) estimate  of  the  conditional  = 
expense  for medical  services 
A  A  if  any inpatient, 
$I,,  $I4 = 	 estimated retransformation ("smear- 
ing")  factors of  the error  terms  for 
level of  outpatient only and any in- 
patient expenditure equations. 
Our  estimates bf  ~redicted  ex~enditure 
presented  below  are based  on equBtion (2). 
We use  equation  (2) to predict  medical  ex- 
penditure for each person we enrolled, alter- 
natively placing that person on each plan (by 
successively  turning  on  plan  dummy  vari- 
ables).  We  then  average  withn plans  over 
each predicted value to obtain a mean value 
4= ,!3,,  OLS estimate of 
for  each  plan.  Standard  errors of  the  pre- 
dicted  values  are  obtained  by  the  delta 
and  i  indexes  the  person.  The  smearing 
estimate is weakly consistent (asymptotically 
unbiased)  for the retransformation factor if 
the  error  distribution  does  not  depend  on 
the characteristics xI.l7 
A  consistent  estimate  of  the  expected 
medical  expense for person  i  based  on the 
four-equation model is given by 
(2)  E ( Medzcal Expenditure,) 
where  bI=  @(xI@,) 
=estimated probability of any 
medical use, 
6, =  =  estimated  conditional  prob-
ability for a medical  user  to 
have any inpatient use, 
exp(~,@~);, =  estimate  of  conditional )  the 
expense for medical  services 
if  outpatient only, 
"Moreover.  when the normal assumption does hold, 
the  smearing  factor has  high  efficiency  (90  percent  or 
more) relative to the normal retransformation for a wide 
range of  parameter values. including those in this analy- 
sis (see Duan, 1983. Section 5; and F. Mehran. 1973). In 
the results presented below. the smearing factors for the 
log  level  of  expense for outpatient only users  are esti- 
mated separately by plan and year to allow for hetero- 
scedasticity. For the  log level of  expenses  for users of 
any inpatient services, the smearing factor is a constant. 
See  Duan et al. (1983)  and  Appendix  C  of  Manning 
et al.  (1987)  for  a  comparison  of  normal  theory  and 
nonparametric retransformations. 
method (see  Duan et al.,  1983, pp. 40, 48). 
The regression equations underlying our pre- 
dicted values are presented in Manning et al. 
(1987). 
B.  Correlation in the Error Terms 
Although  we  have  over  20,000  observa- 
tions, we  do not have  the  same number  of 
independent  observations,  because  of  sub-
stantial  positive  correlations  in  the  error 
terms among family members and over time 
among  observations  on  the  same  person. 
These correlations exist in all four equations. 
Failure to account for them in  the analysis 
would yield inefficient estimates of  the coeffi- 
cients  and  inconsistent  estimates  of  the 
standard errors. In the results presented  be- 
low we have corrected the inference statistics 
(t, F, and  X2) for  ths positive  correlation 
using a nonparametric approach.'x 
C.  Selection Modes 
The econometric literature provides an ad- 
ditional class of  models  for continuous but 
limited dependent variables such as medical 
he correction  is  similar  to  that  for  the  random 
effects least squares model, or equivalently the intraclus- 
ter correlation model (S. R. Searle, 1971). The model is 
described in Brook et al. (1984), based or, prior work by 
P. J. Huber (1967) on the variance  of  a robust regres- 
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expenditure. These models include the Tobit 
model  (James  Tobin,  1958),  the  Adjusted 
Tobit  model  (Wynand  van  de  Ven  and 
Bernard  van  Praag,  1981a,b), and  sample 
selection models (G. S. Maddala, 1983). Like 
our  four-equation  model,  these  are  multi-
equation models,  with  an equation (often  a 
probit)  for  whether  there  is  a  positive 
amount, and another equation for  the  level 
of  the positive  amount. These models differ 
from ours in  that they  explicitly  model  the 
correlation  between  the  probability  of  any 
use and the level of  use. Although they may 
appear to be  more  general,  in  fact  for  ths 
problem they are not (Duan et al., 1984). In 
particular,  the four-equation  model just  de- 
scribed is not nested within the sample selec- 
tion model. Manning et al. (1987) provides a 
fuller discussion of  these models and, using a 
split-sample validation,  show that  the  four- 
equation  model  has  significantly  less  bias 
than  the sample selection model and is sta- 
tistically  indistinguishable  on  the  basis  of 
mean  square  error.19 In  a  separate  Monte 
Carlo study,  Manning,  Duan,  and William 
Rogers (forthcoming) show that models such 
as  the  four-equation  model  can  be  more 
robust, and are no worse than selection mod- 
els when  the data are truly  generated  by  a 
selection model. 
111.  Empirical Results 
A.  Man  EfSeerts of  Insurance Plan: 

ANOVA Estrmates 

The data from the Health Insurance Ex- 
periment (HIE) clearly show that the use of 
medical  services responds  to changes in  the 
amount paid out-of-pocket. Table 2 provides 
the  sample  means  and  standard  errors  by 
plan for several  measures  of use of  services 
-the  probability of  being treated, visit  and 
admission rates, and total expenses. The per 
capita expenses on the free plan (no out-of- 
"The  bias  in  the  selection  models  in  the  forecast 
sample was  appreciable. on the order of 10-25  percent 
of  the mean in the two replications we made (p  1.lo). 
In contrast, the bias for the 4-part model was 2 percent 
(I  = .50). 
pocket  costs)  are  45  percent  higher  than 
those  on  the  plan  with  a  95  percent 
coinsurance  rate,  subject  to an upper  limit 
on  out-of-pocket  expenses.  Spending  rates 
on plans with  an intermediate level of  cost 
sharing lie between these two extremes. The 
right-most  column  shows that  adjusting  for 
the  site imbalance in  plan  assignments (see 
Table 1) makes little difference. 
Cost sharing affects primarily the number 
of  medical contacts, rather than the intensity 
of  each of  those contacts. In other words, the 
differences  in expenditures  across plans  re-
flect real variation in the number of  contacts 
rather  than  an increase  in  the  intensity  or 
charge  per  ~ervice.~' For  example,  outpa- 
tient  expenses  on the free plan  are 67 per-
cent  higher  than  those  on  the  95  percent 
plan, whlle outpatient visit rates are 66 per-
cent hlgher. 
The largest decreases in the use of  outpa- 
tient services occurs between the free and 25 
percent plans,  with  smaller  but  statistically 
significant  differences  between  the  25  per- 
cent and other family coinsurance (pay) plans 
(X2(2)= 9.48, p < .01). 
There are no significant differences among 
the family coinsurance (25, 50, and 95  per- 
cent) plans  in  the use of  inpatient services. 
For  the  probability  of  any  inpatient  use, 
total  admission  rates,  and  inpatient  ex-
penses, the contrasts between the 25, 50, and 
95 percent plans have p  values greater than 
0.50. As  noted above, this lack  of  a signifi- 
cant difference is probably due to the effect 
of  the upper limit on out-of-pocket expenses. 
Seventy percent of  people with inpatient care 
exceeded  their  upper limit. Hence, the out- 
of-pocket  cost  of  a  hospitalization  was  at 
most $1000 (in current dollars), and did not 
vary much among the pay plans (other than 
the individual deductible)." 
2n~eeler and  John  Rolph  (1982)  found  that  cost 
sharing affected  the number  of  episodes  of  treatment. 
rather than the size of  the episode. They used data from 
the first  three years of  the Dayton site  Kathleen  Lohr 
et al. (1986) found a similar result for diagnosis-specific 
episodes. 
21~h~s is  a good example of  the  difference between 
the response to a marginal price or coinsurance and the 
response to plan.  OR A~NIIAI  P~K TABLL 2-SA~IPLL  MLA~S  USFor  MFDIOU S~K\ICIS  C~PIIA 
Pl'in 
Fdie-to-
Face 
\.i5it\ 
Outpatlent 
Expense\ 
(1984 $) 
Admlr-
\ion\ 
Inpatlent 
Dollar\ 
(1984  %) 
I'rob  An\ 
Medl~dl 
($1 
Proh  An\ 
Inpatient 
($1 
Tot'il 
Expenser 
(19h4$) 
Adluated 
Total r\pen\e\ 
i19h4 $1' 
I:rcc  4.55 
25 I'ercent 
(.l68) 
3.33 
50 I'crcent 
i.190) 
3.03 
95 Percent 
(221) 
2 73 
Indi~ idual 
(.I771 
3.02 
L)educt~hle  (.171) 
('l~i-Squared  (4)" 
P Value for 
68 8 
<.0001 
85' 
<,0001 
117 
.02 
3.1 
n.b. 
134.7 
<,0001 
19.5 
,0006 
15.9 
003 
17 0 
,001 
ciii-Squared (4, 
lore: All standard errors (aliown in parenthezea) are corrected for intertemporal and intrafamil!  correlations. Dollars 
are expressed in June 1984 dollars. Yisits are face-to-face contacts aith MD. DO, or other health pro~iders:  cxcludes 
Lislt5 for only radiolog!.  anesthesiology or patholog!  services. Visits and expcnses exclude dental care and outpatlent 
p~h~chotherap! 
The  figure\  in  th~s  column  are adjusted  for  the  imbalance of  plan5  across  the  ~tc-specliic  sites  ah  foll~~r: 
rehponhes  on each plan (simple means b!  site) are weighted  b!  the  fraction of  the sarnple in e,~ch  site and \um~ncd 
:ccr-oh\ hitch. In the case of  the  50 percent  plan. \\hieh  has  no observations in  Scattlc. the  \xc~ght>  are renormalized 
excluding Seattle. 
hThc chi-square statlstlc w~th  4 d.f. tests  the  null  hhpothesls of  no dlll'crence  among  the  ti~e  plan  means. Thc 
c.ili-square statistic  15 a Wald  test  from  the  robust estimate of  the  information  matrix  (see Brook  et al . 1984, for 
further detailr). It  15 used  In  lieu of  the  usual  F-statistic hccausc of  the d~fficulth  of  coriiputing buch a >t~t~btic nhile 
allowing for intertemporal and interfarnil!  correlation. 
The Individual Deductible plan exhibits a 
somewhat  different  pattern  from  the  other 
cost sharing plans. Recall that this plan has 
free  inpatient care, but  a  95  percent  coin-  Because sample means are quite sensitive 
surance rate  (up to a  $150  per  person, or  to  the  presence  of  catastrophic  cases.  we 
$450 per family  annual maximum) for out-  used  the  four-equation  model  to  provide 
patient  services.  Total expenditures on this  more  robust  estimates  of  the  plan  re-
plan are significantly  less than the free plan  ~~onses.'~ use  of  covariates  in  these The 
(t  = -2.34. p <.02). This overall response is  equations further enhances precision  and re- 
the sum of  a one-third reduction  in  outpa- 
tient  expenses (t  = -6.67),  and a  less  than 
one-tenth  reduction  in  inpatient  expenses 
?,--For  exarnple,  the  AKOVA  estimates  of  the  re-
(t  = -0.68).  Thus,  this  plan  looks  like  a  sponse to cost sharing for total expenses (not adjusted 
combination  of  the 50  or 95  percent  plans  for  site)  show  a  stat~sticall!  Insignificant  reversal  be-
tween  the  50  and  25  percent  plans. Although  such  a for outpatient care and the free of 25 percent  reversal 1s  compatible nith theory (due to the MDE) the 
plan  for inpatient care. The admission  rate  reversal  is  almost  certainl!  due  to  chance.  One  par- 
for  the  Individual  Deductible  plan  lies  ticipant  on  the  50  percent  plan  had  a  verq  expensivtl 
roughly  midway between  the free plan  and  hospitalization  (total  medical  expenses  of  $148.000  In 
one 'ear):  that single observation, Lxhich was the largest  family  coinsurance  plan  rates,  suggesting  a  obsenation in  the  entire sample, adds $106 dollars to 
nontrivial  cross-price  elasticity  between  in-  the  50  percent  plan  mean  (16 percent  of  that  plan's 
patient and outpatient services.  mean). 260  THE AMERlC4h' ECONOMIC REVIEW  JLh'F 1987 
TABLE 3-VARIOUS  MEASURES OF PREDICTED MEAK 
ANNUAL USEOF M~DICAL SERVICES, BY PLAN 
Likelihood  One or More  Medical 
of An\ U\e  Ad~niss~ons  Expenses 
Plan  (%  (F)  (1984 S) 
Free  86.7 
(0.67) 
Family Pay 
25 Percent  78.8 
(0.99) 
50 Percent  74.3 
(1 86) 
95 Percent  68.0 
(1.48) 
Individual  72.6 
Deductible  (1.14) 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Medi-
cal  services exclude dental  and  outpatient psychother-
apy  The predictions arc for the enrollment population 
carried  forward  through  each  year  of  the  study.  The 
standard  errors  are  corrected  for  intertemporal  and 
intrafamily correlation. The t-statistics for the contrasts 
with  the  free  plan  are  -6.69,  -6.33,  -11.57,  and 
- 10.69 for the last  four rows  of  the  first  col.. respec-
tively;  -2.74, 3.57,  -4.80.  and - 1.28 for  the  last 
four rows  of  the second col., respectively, and  -4.05. 
-4.91.  -6.74.  and -3 78 for the last four rows of  the 
third col.. respectively. These t-statistics are larger than 
those  one  would  compute  from  the  standard  errors 
shown in  the  table because  use  of  the standard errors 
ignores the positive covariance between the two predict-
ed  plan  means  from  the  shared  XP  terrns.  The dif-
ferences  in  expenses  between  the  25  and  50  percent 
plans are significant at the 5 percent level (t  = 1.97). and 
between  the SO  and 95 percent  plans are significant at 
the  6 percent  level  (t  =1.93). The parameter  estimates 
underlying  these  predictions are available  in  Manning 
et al. (1987) 
moves the relatively minor imbalances across 
plan, including  the site  imbalance. Table  3 
presents  estimates  from  this  model  of  plan 
response  for  the  probability  of  any use  of 
medical services, the unconditional probabil-
ity  of  any inpatient  use,  and  total  medical 
expenses. Figure  1 displays the expenditure 
results. 
Mean  predicted  expenditure  in  the  free 
care plan is 46 percent higher than in the 95 
percent  plan  (p  < .001), almost  exactly  the 
difference found in the sample means.23Like 
"It  may seem that thls is a trivial result that follows 
frorn  the orthogonality of  plan  and covariates.  Such is 
not the case because of  the nonlinear transforrnations in 
the  4-part model.  Using  the  logarithm  of  expenditure 
-
9See;ent  confidence 
. Mear exoendllure 
the  sample  means,  these  more  robust  esti-
mates also indicate that the largest response 
to  plan  occurs  between  free  care  and  the 
25  percent  plan,  with  smaller  decreases 
thereafter. 
Not  surprisingly,  given  the  approximate 
orthogonality of  plan and covariates, adding 
covariates  does  not  change  the  estimated 
probability of  any use of  medical services-
87 percent  of  the free plan participants are 
predicted to use any service during the course 
of  the  year,  whlle  only  68  percent  of  the 
95  percent  plan participants are. These dif-
ferences in  the  likelihood  of  receiving  any 
care account for over three-fifths of  the over-
all response to cost sharing. Virtually all the 
remaining  response  is  attributable  to  the 
effect of  cost sharing on hospital admissions. 
Cost  sharing  for  outpatient  services only 
(the individual  deductible plan)  produces  a 
different  pattern  of  utilization  than  cost 
sharing for all services. Outpatient-only cost 
sharing reduces total expenditures relative to 
free care ( p <.0001), largely by reducing the 
likelihood  of  any  use  (p  < .0001).  Outpa-
tient-only cost sharing also reduces inpatient 
use, but by an insignificant  amount (p  =.20 
for  the  probability  of  any  inpatient  use). 
This last result is the only important change 
plus $5, for example, as a dependent variable instead of 
the 4-part model would  lead to a much larger estimate 
of  plan response, one that would be biased upward. (See 
Duan et al., 1983; Manning et al., 1987.) VOL. 77 i?;O. 3  MAi?;NIi?;G  ET A1  ...  HEALTH INSL'RANCE 
TABLE ~-VARIO~JS  OF PREDICTED  USEOF  ~~EDICAL MEASURES  ANNUAL  SERVICLS, 
BY INCOME GROUP 
Significance Tests 
Income  t on Contrast of: 
Lowest  Middle  Highest  Middle  Highest 
Third  Third  Third  vs. Lowest  vs. Lonest 
Plan  Mean  Mean  Mean  Thirds"  Thirds" 
Likelihood of Any Use (Percent) 
Free  82.8  87.4  90.1 
Farnily Pay 

25 Percent  71.8  80.1  84.8 

50 Percent  64.7  76.2  82.3 

95 Percent  61.7  68.9  73.8 

Individual 

Deductible  65.3  73.9  79.1 

Likelihood of  One or More Admissions (Percent) 
Free  10.63  10.14  10.35 
Family Pay 

25 Percent  10.03  8.44  7.97 

50 Percent  9.08  8.06  7.77 

95 Percent  8.77  7.38  7.07 

Individual 

Deductible  9.26  9.44  9.88 

Expenses (1984 $) 
Free  788  736  809 
Family Pay 

25 Percent  680  588  623 

50 Percent  610  550  590 

95 Percent  581  494  527 

Individual 

Deductible  609  594  670 

Note: Excludes dental and outpatient psychotherapy  Predictions for enrollment popu- 
lation carried forward for all years of  the study. 
"The  t-statistics  are corrected  for  intertemporal  and  intrafarnily  correlation.  The 
statistics  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  mean of  middle (highest) thlrd  equals  the 
mean of  the lowest third: for example, the 4.91 figure implies we can reject  at the ,001 
level  the hypothesis  that in the free plan  the likelihood of  any use  for the lowest and 
middle thirds of  the income distribution are equal. 
from the previously published analysis of  the  across subgroups. These included differences 
first 40 percent of  the data (Newhouse et al.,  in  responses  across  income  groups,  dif-
1981). In that analysis, inpatient use was less  ferences  between  adults  and  children,  dif- 
on the deductible plan, and one could reject  ferences between  the sickly and healthy, as 
at the 5 percent level the hypothesis that the  well as differences across time (for example, 
free  plan  and  individual  deductible  plan  any  transitory  surges  in  use  as  insurance 
means for inpatient use were the same. This  changed),  and  differences  across  medical 
difference may have  occurred because infla-  markets (for example, urban vs.  rural). 
tion in the late 1970's reduced  the real value 
of  the  deductible,  which  was  kept  fixed  at  1.  Across  Income  Groups.  Different  aspects 
$150 (i.e., in nominal dollars), or may have  of  the use of  medical services exhibit differ- 
simply been  due to chance.  ent responses to income (Table 4).14 In Ta- 
C. Use by Subgroups 
24Recall that  the  income  measure  comes  from  the 
An  goal  of  the  HIE  was  to 
first partial year of  enrollment.) The division into thirds 
is  site  specific  (for  example,  the  lowest  thud  is  the 
study how the response to cost sharing varied  lowest third of  each site's income distribution), because 262  THF 4  ZfLNIC 4 1' FCOZOZlIC RF  VILLV  JL\I  1Vh7 
ble  4 we  observe differences in use that are 
due to both income directly and the effects 
of  variables correlated with  income: that is. 
these are not partial effects. 
Within each of  the five plans the probabil- 
ity  of  any  use of  medical  services increases 
with  income.  with  larger  increases  for  the 
family  pay  (25.  50.  and  95  percent)  and 
individual  deductible  plans  than  the  free 
plan.'5 In contrast. the (unconditional) prob- 
ability  of  any use  of  inpatlent  services  de- 
clines with income for the family pay plans. 
but  is  not  significantly  different  across  in-
come  groups  for  the  two  plans  with  free 
inpatient  care  (the  free  and  individual  de- 
ductible plans).  Because  of  these  two  con- 
flicting effects of  income-positive  on outpa- 
tient use  but  negative on inpatient use-the 
net  result  on total  expenditure is  a shallow 
U-shaped response. 
Our estimate of  the differences by income 
group  within  the  fanllly-pay  plans  is  in-
fluenced by the income-related upper limit in 
out-of-pocket  expenses.  The  observed  re-
sponse  in  a  combination  of  the  direct  re-
sponse to income, and the fact that families 
with lower incomes are more likely to exceed 
their  (lower) limit  and receive free care for 
part of  the  year."  If medical  care is a nor- 
mal good, then  any positive direct effect  of 
greater  income  would  be  reduced  by  the 
decreased likelihood  of  going over the limit. 
In the case of  the  positive  effect of  income 
on  the  probability  of  any  use.  the  direct 
income  effect  is  probably  more  important. 
and in the case of  the negative  effect on the 
probability  of  any  inpatient  use.  the  limit 
has relatively more infl~ence.'~ 
1)  expenses  are  not  cnrrected  for  cross-sectional 
differences  in  prices,  and  2) \\e did  not  Rant  to con- 
found income and site:  the sites aere chosen  to repre- 
sent  a spectrum  of  medical  market  characteristics.  See 
Manning  et al  (1987.  Table  1.  Appendix  D) for  the 
ANOL'A estimates by plan income group (as well as by 
other subgroups) 
1(  Note that this is not a c,eterls purrhut  statement. so 
there  is  no contradiction \\ith  standard  thenry.  nhich 
would sugge\t no income efict in the free plan 
Lh See Manning ct al. (1987. Appendix B) for data on 
the  proportion  excecding  the  upper  limit  on  out-
of-pocket expenses 
:'Some  ma!  argue  that  income  is  endogenous uith 
respect  to inpatient expenditure. This ma)  uell be true. 
The Individual Deductible plan provides a 
cleaner  test  of  the  differences  bv  income 
group of use of  medical services, because the 
deductible in that plan is not income related. 
We  observe  an  insignificant  10 percent  in- 
crease in medical exienses between the bot- 
tom  and  top  third  'of  the  income  distribu- 
tion. The effect  of  income is  limited  to an 
increased  likelihood  of  using  outpatient 
services. probably because inpatient services 
are free on this plan. 
Thus  far  we  have  compared  response 
among income groups rather than examining 
the  partial  effect  of  income.  Although  in- 
come  has  a  statistically  significant  positive 
partial  effect  on use  of  service.  the  magni- 
tude  is  small  enough  to  be  swamped  by 
other factors correlated ~ith  income (for de- 
tails see  Manning et al.. 1987. Appendix A. 
Tables 2-4  and 6).2R 
2.  Across  Age  Groups. We found about the 
same outpatient response to insurance plans 
for chlldren (ages less than 18) as for adults, 
but  children  are  less  plan  responsive  for 
inpatient care  (Table 5)"  As  we  observed 
with  a  subset  of  these data (see Newhouse 
et al., 1981 and 1982: Leibouitz et al., 1985). 
we  cannot reject  the hypothesis  that admis- 
sion rates  for children show no response to 
insurance  coverage."'  By  contrast.  adults 
but i\ not likely to account fnr our result because nnl!  a 
few months of  data are "tainted." 
"income has  a  moderatel!  significant  (at  p  <.lo) 
and positive partial erect on use in all but the inpatient 
expenditure  equatinn:  in  the  level  of  outpatient-onl! 
expenditures. however,  the  income  coeficients  are  of 
mixed  sign. The probabilities aith nhich ne can rgect 
the null hypothesis that the incn~ne  coeficients are zero 
are: p  1.001  fnr any use nf  medical services. p  < .10 fnr 
the probability of  any inpatient use given  any medical 
use,  p  <.001 for the (log) level of  outpatient-onl!  use. 
and p  > .10 for (log) level nf  medical expenditure if an! 
inpatient  use.  The  test  statistics  include  plan  incnrne 
interactions  and  missing  value  replacement  d~~~ti~tiy 
variables 
'yRecall  that  children  are  overrepresented  in  the 
stud!  relative  to the population of  our .\ites. Hence, our 
estimates understate (modestly) the population  respon- 
siveney in our sites. 
30~-(4) = 5.19 using ANOVA estimates for the prob- 
ability  of  an\- inpatient use.  and  ~'(4) = 5.36  for  the 
admission rate  Another possible hypothesis  is  no dif- 
ferential  plan  response  for children  relative  to  adults. VOL.  77 KO. i  ,WA h'KI.~'G  ET '4 L.:FJEA LTH 1,VSL'IW ,VCE 
TABLEVARIOUS MEASURES 0'  PK~DICT~D  USEOF MEDICAL AN~IJAL  StR\lCl S. 
BY AG~  AND PLAN GROUP 
Likelihood of  One or More  Medlcal Expcn\e\ 
An\ Use (7)  Admissions (5 )  (1984 $) 
Plan  Mean  Mean  hlcan 
Children 
Free 
Fanuly Pa\ 
25 Percent 
50 Percent 
95 Percent 
Individual 
Deductible 
Adults 
Frec 
Famil) Pa\ 
25 Percent 
50 Percent 
95 Percent 
Individual 
Deductible 
h'ore:  Excludes dental and outpatient psychotherapy senices  The eight r-statistic5 for 
the contrasts between the  free plan and the pa!  plans for the likelihood of  any use all 
exceed 6. For one or more admissions, the r-statistics for children for contrasts with the 
free plan  (rous 2-5)  are 055, 1.13. 1.81, and  0.63,  respecti\cl!,  and  for adult5 are 
2 92.  3.64. 4 69. and  1.89, respecti\elq  (for esa~nple.  the  r-statistic  on  the  diRerence 
between  13.9 and 12.1 is 1.89). For medical expenses the  r-statistics on contrasts with 
the free plan for chldrcn are 2 16. 2 20. 4 10. ;nd  142. respcctivel),  and for adult5 are 
3.70. 4.80, 6.07, and 3.63. respectivcl>. 
have  significantly  lower  use  of  inpatient  observed  no differential  response  to health 
services  on the  family-pay  plans  than  they  insurance coverage between the healthy and 
do  on  the  free  plan.31  For  outpatient  the  sickly  (Manning et al., 1987). This null 
services. we observe a very similar pattern of  result  is  striking because  of  the upper  limit 
plan responses for children and adults.  feature. If  anythng, the presence of  an up- 
per  limit  on out-of-pocket  expenses  would 
D. 	Other Subgroups  lead to less plan response for the sickly; all 
other  things  equal,  sicker  individuals  are 
1. Health Status. Although health status was 	 more likely  to exceed  their upper  limit and 
a strong predictor of  expenditure levels. we 	 receive some free care-especially  on the 95 
percent  plan, where  care is  free after gross 
expenditures of  $1050 or more. Furthermore, 
We  can  reject  this  hypothesis:  the  test  statistics  are  some might  expect  the  sickly to be less re- 
x2(4)= 16 49  for  the  probability  of  an!  inpatient  use  sponsive  to  insurance  coverage  than  the 
and  ~'(4) = 14 08  for  total  admissions. Hence.  it  ap-  healthy, on the supposition that their use of 
pears  that  children  and  adults respond  differentl)  and  services is less discretionary. If, in fact, there 
that  children do not respond  to  cost sharing for inpa-  is  no interaction  between  plan  and  health  tient care. 
31  7 
= 24.22  for the  probability  of  any inpatient  status, one can infer that the opposite is true  ~~(3) 
use and 16.31 for the admission rate  By contrast, there  at  the  margin:  that  is,  at  the  margin  the 
are  no  significant  differences  among  the  family  pay  sickly exhibit more discretion. 
plans for adults  x2(2)= 1.69 for expenditures.  0 73 for 
total  admissions,  and  1.39 for  the  probability  of  any  2. Sites. The six sites in the HIE were selected  inpatient  use,  again  based  on ANOVA (see Manning 
et al..  1987.  Table  2.  Appendix  D  for  the  ANOVA  to reflect  a  spectrum  of  city  sizes,  waiting 
estimates).  times  to  appointment,  and  physician  to Year I of Dental Coverage 
Expenses 
Dental  Proba- Per 
Insurance  bilit?  E.nrollee 
Plan  (9)  Visits  ($1 
Free  68 7 
(1  19) 
25 Percent  53 6 
(3  39) 
50 Percent  54 1 
(141) 
95 Percent  47 1 
(2 59) 
Ind~\~dual  48 9 
Deductible  (2 12) 
Year 1of  Dental Coverage 
Expenses 
Proba- pcr 
bilit!  Enrollee 
(  )  Visits  (J) 
Wore: Expenses were con~erted  to Januar)  1984 dollars using the dental fee component of  the Consumer Price Index. 
There has been  no adjustment  for regional differences in prices, or difcrences in population  characteristics across 
plans and years. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are corrected for ~ntrafamilq  correlations. 
population  ratios (Newhouse.  1974)."  Our 
concern was  that  the response to insurance 
coverage  could  vary  according  to  the  com- 
plexity  of  the medical  market  or to the ex- 
cess demand in the medical delivery system. 
Yet we found no differences among the sites 
in  the  response  to  insurance  coverage. 
X2(19)  =14.96  (p  >.50). The uniformity  of 
response across the sites gives  some reason 
to believe  the results may  be  representative 
of  the  United  States, and we  have  so used 
them below. 
Interestingly. the site with the longest  de- 
lay  to appointment and lowest physician to 
population ratio (Fitchburg) had the second 
highest  probability  of  any  use,  the  second 
highest  expenditures  per  enrollee,  and  the 
highest probability of  any inpatient use. The 
latter  two  phenomena  may  represent  sub-
stitution  of  inpatient  for  outpatient  care 
(Jeffrey McComhs, 1984). and the first may 
indicate  that  the  presence  of  emergency 
rooms  removes  the constraint of  the  queue 
(Stephen  Long,  Russell  Settle,  and  Bruce 
Stuart, 1986).33 
2. Period  of  E~~rollment.  As noted above, we 
enrolled families for three or five vears to see 
if  the  response  to  insurance  changed  over 
time  and  if  the  duration  of  enrollment 
mattered. The free plan might generate tran- 
sitorily  high  demand;  the  95  percent  plan 
might  generate postponement of  demand at 
the  end  of  the  experiment  (Arrow,  1975; 
Metcalf, 1973).  Neither effect was found; see 
Manning  et al.  (1987) for  further  detail^.'^ 
Nor  did  duration  of  enrollment  matter  to 
either  the  absolute level  of  spending  or the 
responsiveness  to plan. 
3.  Subexperiments. As  described  above, the 
Health  Insurance  Experiment  contained  a 
number of  subexperiments to study methods 
effects.  None  of  the  subexperiments  had  a 
measurable  effect on expenditure  (Manning 
et al., 1987). 
3'For  example. cit!  sizes in 1970 ranged from 34.000 
(Georgetown Count!)  to  1.2 million  (Seattle), waiting  '?Length  of  wating time  to an appointment uith a 
times for nonemergent care in 1973-74  ranged from 4 1  prin1a1-y care physician is associated positivel!  uith the 
days (Seattle) to 25.0 da~s  (Fitchburg). and physicians  use of  emergent)  rooms (O'GradS  et al.). 
per caplta in  1972 ranged  from 30 per  100.000 (Fitch-  ''~  effect  was  found  for  dental  ser~ices;  transiton, 
burg) to 59 per 100.000 (Seattle).  see Manning et al. (1985, 1986a) for details. 265  VOI.. 77 .NO. 3  MA.h'IVIIVG ETAL.: HEALTH IIVSL  KA.V(  11 
E.  Dental Results 
These results are reported in greater detail 
elsewhere (Manning et al.. 1985, 1986a). Den- 
tal  services  do show  greater  responsiveness 
to plan  in  Year  1 than in  subsequent years 
(p  < ,001) (Table 6). This would be expected 
if  dental  services  were  more  durable  than 
other medical  services. as is  plausible.  The 
responsiveness of  demand by plan in Year 2, 
whlch is typical of  the middle years. is of  the 
same  general  magnitude  as  that  for  other 
medical services. 
F. Health Status Outcome Results 
These results also  are reported  in greater 
detail  elsewhere  (Brook  et al..  1983,  1984: 
Valdez  et al.;  Valdez;  Howard  Bailit  et al., 
1985). For the person with mean characteris- 
tics,  we  can  rule  out  clinically  significant 
benefits  from  the  additional services in  the 
free fee-for-service plan relative to either the 
cost-sharing plans or the HMO experimental 
group. For poor adults (the lowest  20  per-
cent of  the income distribution) who began  -
the  experiment  with  high  blood  pressure 
(specifically,  who  were  in  the  upper  20 
percent of  the diastolic blood pressure distri- 
bution) there was  a clinically significant re- 
duction  in  blood  pressure  in  the  free  fee- 
for-service  plan compared  to the plans with 
cost  sharing.  Epidemiologic data imply  that 
the magnitude of  this reduction would lower  u 

mortality about 10 percent each year among 
this  group,  about 6 percent  of  the  popula- 
tion. (The sample size is much  too small to 
test  this  prediction  with  actual  mortality 
among  the  experimental  population.)  For 
poor adults who began  the experiment with 
vision  vroblems  thit  were  correctable  with 
eyeglasses, there was a modest improvement 
in  corrected  vision.  Individuals  on  the  free 
care  plan  between  the  ages  of  12 and  35 
showed a modest im~rovement  in the health 
of the gums; caries (decayed teeth) were also 
more likely to be filled on the free care plan. 
The specific gains in health just described. 
for high blood pressure, myopia, and dental 
care, were all for relatively prevalent chronic 
problems (of course, we had difficulty detect- 
ing effects  for rare problems)  that  are rela- 
tively  inexpensive  to  diagnose and remedy. 
One can infer that programs targeted at these 
problems would be much more cost effective 
in  achieving  these gains in health than  free 
care for all services. For example, more than 
half  the benefit  of  free care for high blood 
pressure (and presumably  for risk of  dying) 
was available from a one-time screening ex- 
amination. whose cost is a small fraction of 
free care for all services (Keeler et al.. 1985). 
G. Heulth Muintenunce Organizutio~~  Results 
We  also  randomized  a  group  of  par-
ticipants  into an HMO.  the  Group Health 
Cooperative of  Puget Sound in Seattle."  This 
group, whom we  call the HMO Experimen- 
tals, was given a plan of  benefits identical to 
the  free  fee-for-service  (FFS) plan.  In  ad- 
dition, we  enrolled  a random sample of  ex- 
isting  HMO enrollees. the HMO Controls. 
Thus, a comparison of  the experimentals and 
the  free  fee-for-service  plan  establishes  the 
"pure"  HMO effect on use; a comparison of 
the  experimentals  and  controls  establishes 
the extent. if  any, of  selection with respect to 
the HMO.3h 
Our results (Table 7) show no evidence of 
selection in the single HMO that we studied; 
those previously  enrolled  at  the  HMO (the 
Controls) used services at approximately the 
same rate as those who were not previously 
enrolled  (the  Experimentals).  By  contrast, 
the  percentage  of  Experimental  plan  par-
ticipants  with  one or more  hospital  admis- 
sions  was  only  two-thirds  as  great  as  the 
percentage  on  the  free  fee-for-service  plan. 
Because  outpatient  use  was  approximately 
similar  on  the  two  plans,  the  expenditure 
digerence between  the HMO Experimentals 
and  free  fee-for-service  participants  was 
"~n  HMO is reimbursed a fixed amount per month. 
in  return  for  whch it  agrees  to procide  medical  care. 
Thus, unlike  fee-for-senice medicine,  the  approximate 
marginal  revenue from delivering additional services  is 
zero.  Of  course,  there  are  market  constrants on  the 
HMO's  behavlor  becaube  is  compete  with  fee-for-
service rnedlcine  for patients. 
he fce-for-senice sample in  this  comparison  is 
from Seattle. in order to keep  the population  sampled 
the same bet\\een the t\\o groups. --  - - 
TABLE 7-ANNUAL  SER\IC~S  S~ATTLL  BY Hh10 AYD FFS STATUS' US^ OE  ~IFDICAL  PtR CAPITA.  SAMPL~. 
Iniputed 
Imputed  Expenditure\ 
Likelihood  One or More  Expenditures  \\ith Age-Sex 
of  Anv Use  Ad~nlsslons  ANOVA'  Covariatesh  Persol 
Plan  (q)  (T)  (1983 $)  (1983 $)  Year5 
HMO Expenmental 
HMO Control 
Free Fee-for-Service 
[-Statistic on 
Free-Experimental 
Difference' 
p  Value for 
t-Statistic, 2 tail 
"Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample includes participants while  they  remained  in the  Seattl 
area. The sample exc:udes  children born into the study and excludes partial years except for deaths, similar to Table 
1 and 2 above. For HMO Controls and Experimentals, the data include both in- and out-of-plan use. The standar 
errors are corrected for intertemporal and intrafamily correlation using an approach due to Huber in a similar fashio 
to  Tables 1 and  2  above.  The  numbers  differ  slightly  from  those  in  Manning  et al  (1984).  because  of  minc 
corrections in the data. as aell as the use of  a less precise. but more robust method of calculating standard errors. Th 
method is the same as that described in Table 2. 
'see  Manning et al. (1984) for details of  imputation method. 
'Testing  null hypothesis of  no difference  betueen HMO Evperimeatal and Free Fee-for-Service plan. 
somewhat narrower; expenditures per person 
among  the  HMO Experimentals  were  only 
72 percent  of  expenditures  on the free  fee- 
for-service plan. 
These  findings  demonstrate that  a mark- 
edly less hospital-intensive style of  medicine 
than  is  commonlv  ~racticed  in  the  fee- , . 
for-service  system  is  technically  feasible. 
Whether the technical style will be attractive 
to consumers, and, if  it is, whether a market 
of  competing HMOs is economically feasible 
-or  whether adverse selection problems will 
prove  insurmountable  (Michael  Rothschild 
and  Joseph  Stiglitz, 1976)-are  still  some-
what open questions, although  the size and 
history of  large HMOs such as Group Health 
Cooperative of  Puget Sound suggest that the 
stvle is attractive to some consumers. 
In  projecting  the  effect  of  the  growing 
HMO market  share on hospital  admissions 
and medical  expenditure, one must keep in 
mind that the above com~arisons  have been 
made  against  the  free  dare  plan.  Because 
virtually all private fee-for-service health in- 
surance plans include some cost sharing, one 
should  compare  the  reduction  in  hospital 
admissions  at the  HMO, some  35  percen 
with  the  reduction  caused  by  cost  sharin 
some 15 to 25  percent  depending on pla 
The  values  presented  above,  however,  c 
represent the ceteris paribus  HMO effect; 
an HMO were  to  use  cost  sharing, its o' 
served rates of  use might be even lower. 
Consumers  contemplating  enrollment 
an HMO will weigh the cost savings again 
any effect of  the reduction  in services up( 
health status and consumer satisfaction. 0 
findings  on health  status of  the  HMO a 
analogous to those in the free fee-for-servi 
system;  the  mean  person  in  the  fee-fc 
service  plan  appeared  to  derive  few  or  I 
benefits from the additional hospital servic 
(Ware  et al.,  1986;  Elizabeth  Sloss  et 
1987). Those  who  are both in poor  heal 
and of  low  income who  were  in  the  HM 
exhibited a higher rate of  bed-days and se 
ous symptoms (relative to those in the  f~ 
fee-for-service  plan).  There  is  thus  so1 
suggestive evidence that special programs 
facilitate  access  for  Medicaid  enrollees 
HMOs may be worthwhile,  but we  cauti 
that  this result  comes only from one Hb (albeit a well-established  and well-regarded 
HMO) and that the precision with which we 
could measure results  among the poor, sick 
group makes this result  less than definitive, 
even in the case of  this HMO. 
Those who had self-selected the HMO (the 
Controls) were  on average as  satisfied  with 
their care as those in the fee-for-service  sys- 
tem  (Allyson  Davies  et al.,  1986).  Theory 
would suggest  the marginal person would be 
equally  satisfied  in  both  systems, and  it  is 
not surprising that we detected no difference 
for the average person. By contrast, the HMO 
Experimentals were less satisfied overall with 
their  care  than  those  in  the  fee-for-service 
system, although on certain dimensions they 
were as satisfied or even more satisfied. 
IV.  Conclusions 
A. 	On Comparing our Estimates of  Demand 
with those in the Literature 
Our results leave little doubt that demand 
elasticities for medical care are nonzero and 
indeed  that  the response  to  cost  sharing is 
nontrivial.  How  do our  estimates  compare 
with those in the nonexperimental literature? 
This  question  is  difficult  to  answer,  be- 
cause most prior empirical work has parame- 
terized cost sharing as a constant coinsurance 
rate (for example, Feldstein, 1971, 1977) or 
has  examined  particular  changes  in  in-
surance plans (for example, an imposition of 
a  $3  per  visit  copayment:  Scitovsky  and 
Snyder; Phelps and Newhouse, 1972; Scitov- 
sky  and McCall). By  contrast, experimental 
policies  were  from  a  two-parameter  family 
(coinsurance  rate  and  maximum  dollar  ex-
penditure). We  make no apologies  for  this 
intentional  noncomparability;  a  constant 
coinsurance  rate,  while  convenient  for  ob- 
taining comparative statics results, is not an 
insurance policy  that theory  suggests would 
be optimal, assuming risk  aversion (Arrow, 
1963, 1971, 1973, 1975). Indeed, an optimal 
policy  would  almost  certainly  contain  a 
stop-loss feature, exactly as the experimental 
plans did." 
A  stop-loss  feature  means  there  is  a  maximum 
out-of-pocket  loss  that  the  insured  can sustain. In  ad- 
One could, of  course, attempt to estimate 
the functional response of  demand to varia- 
tion in the two parameters; one can view the 
values presented  above as selected  points in 
the  response  surface  generated  by  varying 
coinsurance  at  given  maximum  dollar  ex-
penditure  levels.  In order  to  compare  our 
results with  those in the literature, however, 
we  must extrapolate to another part  of  the 
response  surface,  namely,  the  response  to 
coinsurance variation when there is no maxi- 
mum dollar expenditure. Although any such 
extrapolation  is  hazardous  (and  of  little 
practical  relevance  given  the  considerable 
departure  from  optimality  of  such  an  in-
surance policy), we have undertaken such an 
extrapolation rather than forego entirely any 
comparison with  the  literature. Specifically, 
we  have  used  three  different  methods  to 
estimate a price elasticity comparable to the 
estimates in the literature: 
1) One can estimate a pure coinsurance 
elasticity  by  analyzing  variation  in  the  de- 
mand for e~isodes  of  care rather than annual 
expenditure  per  person  (Keeler  and  John 
Rolph, 1982; Keeler et al., 1987). The theory 
of  demand  suggests  that  individuals  who 
have  not  yet  exceeded  the  upper  limit  on 
out-of-pocket  expenses,  when  making  a 
marginal medical consumption decision, will 
discount the nominal price by  the probabil- 
ity of  exceeding the limit (because with that 
probability  the  true  price  is  zero)  (Keeler, 
Newhouse,  and Phelps, 1977; Randall  Ellis, 
1986).38  We  therefore examine  demand  for 
episodes of  treatment by individuals who are 
more than $400 from their limit. This gives 
an approximation of  the pure price effect if 
such  people  treat  the  true  probability  of 
exceeding  their  limit  as  nearly  zero.3'  The 
ditlon  to  its  risk-reduction  propertie\,  no  aorst-case 
pa\ment would ha\e been pos(ib1e u~thout  a stop-loss 
feature,  and  hence  jelectlon  effects  [night hace  been 
introduced lnto the experiment 
he speclhc result requlres nsk neutralltk  and sep- 
arablht\  of  the utll~th  funct~on  In health and mane\  but 
the qualitative results does not 
"~ecause there  aaj  no  appreciable  d~fference  be- 
taeen demand for outpatlent episodes uhen the  MDE 
remanlng uas betueen $1 and  $400  and uhen ~t &a\ 
Inore than  $400.  this  assu~nptlon  setms reajonable  for 
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TABLE  8-ARC  ELASTICITIES  TYPES OF CARE FOR VARIOUS 
CALCULATED FROM EPISODES" 
Range of  Type of Care 
Nominal 
Coinsurance  outpatientb  All 
Variation  Acute  Chronic  Well  Allc  Hospital  CareC 
0-25  Percent  .16  .20  .14  .17  .17  .17 
(.02)  (.04)  (.02)  (.02)  (.04) 
25-95  Percent  .32  .23  .43  .31  .14  .22 
(.05)  ~07)  (.05)  (.04)  (.lo)  (.06) 
"The method of  calculating  standard errors (shown in parentheses) is described  in 
Keeler et al. (1987). 
c cute  conditions are unforeseen  and  treatment  opportunities  are  nondeferrable. 
Chronic episodes comprise foreseen and continuing expenditure: treatment is designed 
to  ameliorate the consequences of  the  disease  rather  than  cure. Flare-up of  chronic 
conditions, which are unforeseen, ue treat as acute. Well care episodes are medically 
deferrable without great loss and can occur when the patient is not considered  sick. 
'Estimate  derived  by  weighting  elasticities  for  various  types  of  care  by  budget 
shares. 
ELASTICITIES 
FROM AVERAGE 
estimation  method  controls  for  unobserved  TABLE Y -ARC  FOR VARIOUS 
propensities to have episodes, as well as other  TYPES OF CARE  CALCULATED 
RATES obsened covariates by looking at experience  COINSURANCE 
before and after the MDE is exceeded; see  ~~~~~~f  Range of 
Keeler  and  Rolph  for  a  description  of  the  Nominal  Average 
methodology. We have computed arc elastic-  Coinsurance  Coinsurance  ~11  Outpatient 
ities for the 0-25  and 25-95  percent ranges  Variation  Care  Care 
of  coinsurance;  those elasticities  are shown  0-25  percent  0-16  .lo  .13 
in Table 8.  25-95  Percent  16-31  .14  .21 
2) A  second estimate comes from using 
an indirect utility function and applying it to 
Source:  Calculated  from  data in  Table  2  (outpatient) 
and Table 3 (total). For those who wish to calculate arc 
total expenditure in the 25-95  percent range.  elasticities with  the 50 percent plan,  from  the  data in 
This estimate is very close to the first, -0.18  Tables 2  or 3,  the average  coinsurance rate in  the  50 
(Manning, 1986).  percent plan is 24 percent. 
3) A  third estimate comes from a simi- 
lar calculation to those in the literature, that  rate plan  of  16 or  31 percent  (because the 
is,  it uses  average coinsurance  rates  (Table  effective  coinsurance  rate  is  likely  to  be 
9). The usual proof  of  an upward bias in the  higher); for large expenditures exceeding the 
elasticity  estimate  from  using  the  average  MDE the opposite will be true (because the 
coinsurance  rate  (Newhouse,  Phelps,  and  marginal  coinsurance rate will  be zero, not 
Marquis) does not apply here because of  the  positive).  Which  effect  predominates  is  an 
balance across plans. The amount of  bias, if  empirical  question  the  experimental  data 
any,  depends  on  two  effects  that  work  in  cannot  resolve;  empirically,  thls  method 
opposite  directions. For  small  expenditures  yields  values  that  are  somewhat  lower  but 
the  experimental  plans  will  exhbit smaller  still close to those of  the other two methods. 
expenditure  than would  a pure coinsurance  (The lower value suggests the first bias pre- 
dominates.) 
In sum, these three methods  suggest that 
price elasticities  for a constant  coinsurance 
outpatient  episodes.  It  Ins)  cause  some  bias  in  the 
estimated hospital elasticity; if  the true MDE mere, say  policy are in the -0.1 to -0.2 range, values 
$10.000  rather  than  $1000,  we  might  observe  feuer  that  are consistent with  those in  the lower 
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B. 	On the Explanation of  the Sustained Rise 
in Medical Expenditure 
At  first  blush,  our  estimates  of  demand 
response  imply  that  the  spread  of  health 
insurance  can  account  for  only  a  modest 
portion  of  the postwar  rise  in  medical  ex-
penditure,  contrary  to  the  commonly  held 
view  described  in the introduction. Between 
1950 and 1984, real medical expenditure rose 
by  a  factor  of  7,40 but  our  estimates  of 
insurance  elasticity  do not  begin  to  imply 
this degree of  increase. To demonstrate this 
point, we  use  the average coinsurance  rate. 
Despite its imperfect measure of  the generos- 
ity of  insurance, it is a gross measure of  how 
much insurance changed  over the post-1950 
period  and  therefore  indicative  of  the  role 
insurance might have played in this increase. 
Table 10 shows the average coinsurance rate 
by type of  service (see Table 9 for compara- 
ble  values  from  the 25,  50, and 95  percent 
plans).  Although  the  figures by  service  are 
based  on  an  arbitrary  accounting  conven-
tion,  they  suggest  that  the  chaige  in  in-
surance in the postwar period was of  roughly 
the  same  absolute  magnitude  as  the  dif-
ference between  the 95  oercent coinsurance 
and free care plans.41 
Because  the  free plan  demand  was  only 
around 1.5 times that of  the 95 percent plan, 
it  appears that the change in insurance can 
explain only a small part, perhaps a tenth, of 
the factor of  7 change in health expenditure 
in the ~ost-World  War I1 oeriod. 
Nor can changes in real income (around a 
factor  of  3  during  ths  period)  directly 
account for much of  the rise. Income elastic- 
ities  estimated  from  the  experimental  data 
(the partial  response, not  the one shown in 
Table 5) are at most 0.2-much  too small to 
account  for  anythng  like  a  factor  of  7 
change.42 
4oNominal  expenditure  data from  Katherine  Levit 
et al. (1985) deflated by  the GNP deflator. 
41~he accounting  convention  used  by  the  Health 
Care Financing Administration allocates a common de- 
ductible to senices in proportion  to gross expenditure. 
We  have  followed  the  same  convention in calculating 
comparable figures from the experimental  data. 
42Real  GNP increased  between  1950 and  1983 by  a 
factor  of  2.9.  Even  alloumg  for  the  usual  doanaard 
Year  Hospital  Physician  Other  Total 
Source: Levit et al. (1985). 
Thus, we still must account for the bulk of 
the expenditure increase. The rather obvious 
"accountingn explanation of  the expenditure 
increase is technological change; there are a 
host  of  new  medical  products  and  proce-
dures today  that did not exist in 1950. For 
example, those with kidney failure are now 
treated  with  renal  dialysis  or kidney  trans- 
plantation;  in  1950  these  individuals  died 
rather quickly. This merely pushes the puzzle 
back one stage, however;  what  role, if  any, 
did insurance  (and income growth) play  in 
inducing  the  technological  change?  Unfor- 
tunately  that  question  cannot  be  answered 
from experimental data.4' 
Thus,  if  insurance  is  playing  a  role  in 
inducing  a  welfare  loss,  given  the  rate  of 
increase in medical expenditure, the bulk of 
that loss must come from its having induced 
innovation  for  which  unsubsidized  con-
sumers would not be willing to pay.44  Given 
that  most  countries in  the world  have  also 
experienced  a  long-term  sustained  increase 
in  expenditure  despite  widely  varying  in-
stitutional arrangements, it is  at least  argu- 
able that consumers would be willing to pay 
for  much  of  the increase, but  there  clearly 
bias  from using  measured  income  to  estimate income 
elasticities, it is clear  that changes in  income can only 
explain a modest portion of  the expenditure increase. 
4'~ecause most  consumers  have  been  insured  for 
inpatient services throughout the relevant time period, it 
is  an extremely difficult  question to  answer  from non- 
experimental  data.  Moreover,  one  does  not  observe 
insurance policies  that do and do not cover nea proce-
dures, so there is no straightforward test  of  aillingness 
to pay  for new  technology. Although  virtually all poli- 
cies  do  not  cover  "experimental"  procedures,  once 
efficacy and "safety"  are demonstrated. insurance plans 
tend to cover all procedures. 
44The uillingness-to-pay  calculation  should  include 
any willingness to pay for others' care. has  been  no pure  market  test  (Newhouse, 
1977. 1984). 
C. Oti the Magnitude of  Wefire  Loss 
from  Health Insuranc,e 
Setting aside the issue of  possible  welfare 
loss from induced technological change, one 
can  estimate  the  welfare  loss  in  the  usual 
static framework. Under a number of  strong 
assumptions  (including  that  gross  medical 
care prices are competitive and there are no 
externalities), our estimates imply a nontriv- 
ial  welfare loss  from  first-dollar  health  in- 
surance coverage. An  approximation to the 
loss  from  moving  from  a  universal  95  per- 
cent  plan  (with a  $1000 MDE) to  the  free 
care plan is $37 to $60 billion, as against an 
expenditure  around  $200  billion  on  these 
From the $37-60  billion  figure must be de- 
ducted some amount for the reduced  risk  in 
the free plan relative to the 95 percent plan. 
Usual  values  for  risk  aversion.  however. 
would  suggest  the deduction is small  in  the 
presence  of  a  $1000  cap  (Feldstein,  1973; 
Keeler, Morrow, and Newhouse, 1977). Al- 
though the $37-60  billion figure is probably 
overstated  by  ignoring externalities and as- 
suming medical  care prices  are competitive. 
it  ignores  any  welfare  loss  from  induced 
technological change.46 
D.  On the Exisring Insz~runt  e Coreruge 
of  Various Medical Serclt es 
One can find several economic reasons for 
the traditionally  more generous coverage of 
inpatient services  relative  to outpatient  ser-
\ervices in 1984 by the under 65 p~pulation.~~  vices (Table 10). Loading charges (as a per- 
4'~he  $37  and $60 billion  figures  are calculated  in 
the  usual  Harberger  fashion  bq  taking  the  $325  per 
capita  ditierence  in  spending  between  the  95  percent 
and free plaris  from Tables 3 and 6 (Year 2 ~alues)  and 
adding  $19  for  mental  health  senices  (Vl'ells  et al.. 
inflated  by  the  change  in  the  CPI  Medical  Senices 
prices index betueen 1977 and 1984). We then multiply 
bq  207  million, the number  of  resident  civilians under 
65. This yields  a figure of  $71 billion. One then  multi- 
plies  by  0.525 or 0.845. Both  fractions  are larger  than 
the usual 0.5 because ae  do not start at an unsubsidized 
point. Our 95 percent $1000 MDE plan had an average 
coinwrance rate of  0.31. An upper bound on the uelfare 
loss  come from  assuming  that  individuals  ~alued  the 
last  dollar  at 0.31. A lower  bound on the  welfare  loss 
comes from asauni~ng  that the extra spending is all from 
individual\ nho \slued  the  last  dollar  of  spending  at 
0.95, the  nominal  coinsurance  rate.  The  0.525 figure 
equal5 1 - .95/2, and the 0.845 tigure equals 1 - .31/2. 
The $200 billion figure can be estimated in two naqs: 
1) Data from Levit et al. show expenditure on personal 
health care service\ of  $342 billion in  1984. Waldo and 
Lazenby (19x4. Table 11) estimate that $120 billion of 
this is for the over 65, leaving $222 billion for the under 
65. Some of  this.  houever, is  for noncovered  senices. 
such as nonprescription  drugs, and  some other part is 
for ineligible populations, such as the institutionalized. 
Adjusting  for  these  noncomparabilities  is  necessarilq 
somewhat  in~precise.  but  uould  probablj  leave  a  final 
figure around $200 billion. 2) Data from Tables 3 and 6 
(Year 2  ~alues)  plus  data on outpatient  ~nental  health 
spending from  Wells  et al, inflated  to  1084 and  scaled 
up by  207  million  population  imply an expenditure of 
$224 billion  on the free care plan  in our sites and $178 
billion  on the 25  percent coinsurance  plans. Adjusting 
for price  and  usage  levels  In  our sites  relative  to  the 
nation  is  necessarilq  imprecise,  but  these  two  values 
probably bracket  the true national figure. 
"The  induced  technological change is clearlq only a 
~elfare loss if  patent protection is  at the Ie~el  to induce 
the appropriate  investment in  new  products  in  an un- 
subsidized market. If  there is not enough patent protec- 
tion. there is no ntcessan welfare loss from insurance's 
inducing a too rapid  rate of  inno~ation.  There appears 
to  be  one estimate in  the literature of  the welfare  loss 
from  induced  change:  Feldstein  (1973)  attempted  to 
adjust  for  the  nillingness  of  consumers  to  pa)  for 
"higher  quality care." There is no ernpirical  naq to do 
this. honever. so the magnitude of  the true nelfare loss 
is highlq  problematic. Feldstein's  method. although not 
explicit on the point. in effect ignores true technological 
change. He implicitly assumes that consumers in earlier 
bears  could  have  purchased  "hgher  quality''  medical 
care, hut they choae not  to because the?  faced  a higher 
coinsurance rate and/or  had  lower  incomes. (Alterna- 
tively, physician "norms of  care" were lower becauae of 
the higher  coinsurance  rate  and lower income.) As  the 
renal dialysis example makes clear. howe~er.  consumers 
nere simply unable to purchase some  medical  senices 
in  earlier  years  because  they  did  not  exist.  In  many 
cases  their  subsequent  existence  depended  on  funda-
mental scientific advance such as the discovery of  DKA 
and  would  not  have  occurred  without  that  advance. 
despite lower coinsurance or higher  incornea.  Whether 
conhumers  in  the  195O's and  early  1960's uould have 
purchased such senices if  they  had  existed  then obvi- 
ous1,-  cannot be ansuered from actual expenditure data. 
Feld\tein's  method also yields  an upper bound  for the 
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centage of  premium) are less, and the risk of 
a  large  loss  is  greater.  For  cluldren.  price 
elasticities for inpatient services are not mea- 
surably  different  from  zero,  and  hence  for 
them there is no measurable moral hazard. 
This structure of  more extensive insurance 
for inpatient  services  has  been  attacked  as 
misguided,  however  (Milton  Roemer  et al., 
1975), on the grounds that lack of  insurance 
for outpatient  services deters ignorant indi- 
viduals  from seeking care at a time in  their 
illness  when  they  can  be  treated  relatively 
cheaply. Others have  also asserted  that  the 
more generous coverage of  inpatient services 
leads physicians  to hospitalize  patients who 
could  be  treated  on  an  outpatient  basis, 
thereby  minimizing  private  but  increasing 
social expenditure. 
Analysis  of  a  natural  (not  randomized) 
experiment  supported  the  claim  that  more 
complete coverage of  outpatient expenditure 
reduced  total  expenditure  (Roemer  et al.; 
L. Jay Helms, Newhouse, and Phelps, 1978), 
but  a  prior  controlled  experimental  study 
testing  thls  hypothesis  rejected  it  (Charles 
Lewis and Harold Keairnes, 1970; D. B. Hill 
and James Veney, 1980). At issue is whether 
outpatient  and  inpatient  services  are  sub-
stitutes or complements. 
Our findings decisively reject the hypothe- 
sis  that  increased  coverage  of  outpatient 
services,  holding  constant  the  coverage  of 
inpatient  services,  will  reduce  expenditure. 
As Table 3 shows. the mean expenditure on 
the individual deductive plan (free inpatient, 
costly outpatient care) is 20 percent less than 
the  mean  on  the  free care plan  (free inpa- 
tient,  free  outpatient  care),  and  the  dif-
ference is statistically significant (p < .001).~' 
Disaggregation shows that the outpatient de- 
ductible  not  only  reduces  outpatient  ex-
penditure  (Table  2)  but,  if  anything,  de- 
creases hospital admissions for adults as well 
(Table  5). The (possibly) decreased  admis- 
sions for adults suggests that outpatient and 
inpatient  services  are, if  anything,  comple-
ments not substitutes. 
''~n  the  ANOVA  results  (Table  21,  the  estimated 
reduction is 19  percent and the t-statistic is 2.34 (p  < .02, 
two-tailed test). 
In  the  interests of  brevity  we  summarize 
four other  implications  for health insurance 
coverage  (these  are  discussed  at  greater 
length in Manning et al., 1987): 
There  appears  to  be  little justification 
for the common practice of  group insurance 
policies'  treating  emergency  room  services 
more generously than physician  office visits, 
because emergency room  services are as re- 
sponsive to plan as physician office visit~.~~ 
There  is  no  support  for  the  so-called 
offset  hypothesis,  namely  that  more  com-
plete coverage of  psychotherapy services will 
reduce  total  medical  costs  (or at  least  not 
increase  them)  (W. Follette  and  Nicholas 
Cummings,  1967,  1968).  The  experimental 
data, however,  are not very  precise  on this 
question. 
The  observed  lesser  coverage  of  out-
patient mental health care relative to all out- 
patient care would be consistent with a great- 
er  plan  response  for  mental  health  care. 
Although  the estimated  plan  response is in 
fact  substantially  larger  for  mental  health 
care, the difference with all outpatient care is 
statistically in~ignificant.~' 
Well-care  services  are  about  as  price 
responsive  as  other  medical  services.  Al-
though there are other reasons for the com- 
mon  practice  of  not  covering  well-care 
4XWe assume  that  a  presumed  loner  response  to 
insurance is  the reason  for  greater  coverage  of  emer-
gency room services. The alternative  explanations. dif- 
ferential loading charges or asymmetric information, are 
not particularly  plausible  as explanat~ons  of  the better 
coverage of  emergency room  services.  Asymmetric  in- 
formation  (diKerentia1  knowledge  of  insurer  and  in-
sured) is  not  very  relevant  to a  single  insurance plan 
offered  in  a  group  setting unless  the  service  is  costly 
enough to motivate an employment change (uhlch rnight 
apply to psychotherapy or certainly costly dental services 
such as orthodontia). Routine ofice visits do not match 
this description. Moreover. asymmetric information may 
apply to both office and emergency room services.  An 
individual  rnay knon  that his use of  office visits differs 
from  average  (nhereas the  insurer does not)  but  may 
also knon that his likelihood of  an accident differs frorn 
average, and the insurer rnay not. 
"The  ehtimated ratio of  the free to 95 plan expendi- 
tures  is  233  percent,  compared  nith  a  169  percent 
estimate  for  medical  outpatient  care  (Manning et al.. 
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services  as  generously  as  other  outpatient 
services (primarily there is little or no uncer- 
tainty  and  loadings  are  relatively  high), 
greater price responsiveness  is not a reason. 
E.  Was It Worth It? 
One question  frequently raised  about so- 
cial  experimentation  is  whether  its  benefits 
are  worth  its  costs  (for  example,  Orley 
Ashenfelter, 1986; Robert Haveman, 1986). 
Because the question  concerns the value  of 
information, and because the links from this 
type  of  information to  actual  behavior  are 
generally  impossible  to  establish  with  any 
rigor, the question admits of  no easy answer 
(save for the trivial case in whch the experi- 
ment was  so poorly  designed  or conducted 
that  it produced  no information).  In other 
words, any attempt to justify  the cost of  an 
experiment is necessarily speculative. 
Despite  the  circumstantial  nature of  the 
evidence, we believe that the benefits of  this 
particular  experiment  greatly  exceeded  the 
(current dollar, undiscounted)  costs of  a lit- 
tle  over $80 million ($136 million  if  put in 
1984 dollars, and brought  forward  to  1984 
using  a  3 percent  real  discount  rate.50 Be- 
tween  1982 and  1984, there  was  a  remark- 
able increase  in  initial  cost  sharing  in  the 
United States, at least for hospital services. 
For example, the number  of  major  compa- 
nies with first-dollar charges for hospital care 
rose  from  30  to  63  percent  in  those  two 
years, and the number of  such firms with an 
annual  deductible  of  $200  per  person  or 
more rose from 4 percent to 21 percent (Jeff 
Goldsmith, 1984). Although it is impossible 
to know  how  much  of  ths change  can  be 
attributed  to  the  experimental  results,  the 
initial findings of  the experiment were pub- 
lished  in  December  1981 (Newhouse  et al., 
1981) and December 1983 (Brook et al., 1983) 
and given wide publicity in both the general 
and trade press. In certain instances a direct 
link between changes in cost sharing and the 
experimental results can be made." 
'"we  have used the GNP deflators to inflate costs.  ex or example.  the Xerox  Corporation  in  1983 an- 
nounced  an  increase  in  its  deductible  from  $100 per 
According to the experimental results, this 
increase  in  cost  sharing  should  have  de-
creased  demand.  Hospital  days  (excluding 
deliveries) among the under 65 decreased by 
19 million  days,  or  13 percent,  discharges 
decreased by 8 percent (USDHHS, Series 13, 
1984;  1986).  We  estimate  the  cost  saving 
from this reduced  use to be around $7 bil-
lion.52 Physician  office  and  hospital  visits 
among the  under  65  fell 27  million  during 
these  two  years,  but  to be  conservative we 
have  not  taken  account  of  this  change  in 
estimating the cost savings.53 
person or $200 per family to 1 percent  of  earnings per 
family.  It raised  coinsurance on hospital  and  surgical 
services from 0  to 20  percent.  Additionally, it louered 
its cap on out-of-pocket expenditures (analogous to the 
MDE)  from  6  percent  of  earnings  to  4  percent  of 
earnings. In a  brochure distributed  to its employees it 
said: "According  to a study by the Rand Corporation, 
when consumers are required  to increase their share of 
medical costs, there is a significant decrease in the total 
amount spent for these services. Furthermore, this study 
-and  other similar studies-does  not indicate that the 
health of  the employees was  affected  adversely by  the 
decrease in costs."  Despite the large increase  in initial 
cost sharing,  the average  coinsurance  rate  for hospital 
services  nationally  only  rose  from  7.6 to  8.7 percent 
between  1982  and  1984. This  modest  change  in  the 
average rate may reflect both the lowering of ceilings on 
out-of-pocket expenditure, as in the Xerox case and the 
highly  skewed  distribution  of  hospital  expenditure, 
which means most expenditure exceeds the initial  cost 
sharing. 
52The average  cost  per  hospital  day in 1984 was 
$417. This uses the 1983 $368 figure from the American 
Hospital Association (1984) inflated by 13.3 percent, the 
change in per  day inpatient costs  from  1983 to 1984 
(American Hospital Association, 1985). Bernard Fried- 
man and Pauly (1981, 1983) have argued that the mar- 
ginal cost/average  cost ratio for hospital services is near 
one.  Hence,  a  ceteris paribw  estimate  of  the  savings 
from decreased  use, assuming a marginal cost/average 
cost ratio of  0.9, is around $7 billion (19 million X 417 X 
0.9).  The American Hospital  Association  cost per day 
figure includes the over 65; however, cost per day is not 
very different for the over 65. 
s3In part,  we  do not  account  for  such  a  change 
because the physician visit rate rose in 1985 to its 1982 
value. Thus, the decrease from 1982 to 1984 could have 
been attributable to chance; alternatively  the continued 
decrease in hospital care in  1985 (another 7.1 percent 
decrease in patient-days, USDHHS, 1987) may have led 
to a  substitution of  outpatient use. Data on physician 
visits  are  from  the  National  Health  Interurew  Surrq 
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If  all  the  changes  in  patient-days  were 
attributable  to  the  increased  cost  sharing, 
and if  all the increase in cost sharing is due 
to  the  publication  of  experimental  results, 
and if  the benefits of  the foregone use were 
negligible, as our results suggest, the experi- 
ment  paid  for  itself  in  about  a  week 
(.136/7)(52)!54 It is clear that these assump- 
tions  overstate  the  benefits  of  the  experi- 
ment, yet it is equally clear that the assump- 
tions  can be  greatly  relaxed  and still  yield 
the result  that the experiment was worth it. 
Moreover, we  have ignored  any benefits  to 
countries other than  the United  States, and 
any benefits  from the decrease in physician 
visits  or changes in dental or mental health  u 

coverage  or emergency  room  coverage.  We 
have also ignored any benefits  from  the re- 
sults of  the HMO portion of  the experiment, 
although HMO's market  share has been ex- 
panding  rapidly  from  a  period  just  before 
and subsequent to our first article describing 
the  HMO  results  (Manning  et al..  1984a). 
Finally,  we  have  ignored  the  value  of  the 
public use files to future research efforts.55 
Implicit in our conclusions is the assump- 
tion  that  one could  not  reduce  uncertainty 
with  nonexverimental  data  to  the  satisfac- 
tion  of  those  making  decisions  about  cost 
sharing. We believe this is likely to be true, 
because of  the wide range of  nonexperimen- 
tal  estimates of  insurance elasticity cited in 
the  introduction, the  difficulty  of  inferring 
health  status  effects  from  nonexperimental 
data,  and  the  temporal  proximity  of  the 
changes in cost sharing to the publication of 
the experimental results (many of  the nonex- 
perimental results had been in the literature 
for a decade, during which time cost sharing 
had, if  anything, decreased). Thus, we  think 
it  highly  plausible  that  the  benefits  of  this 
endeavor were indeed worth its costs. 
54The negligible  benefits  assumption  relies  on  the 
observation that cost sharing for hospital  services  was 
near zero in  1982 and  that  there  were  no measurable 
health benefits outside the dental  area for the middle- 
class  employees  who  would  have  been  the  dominant 
group for whom the cost sharing changed. 
"The  public use  files can be ordered from Publica- 
tions  Department.  The Rand  Corporation.  1700 Main 
Street. Santa Monica. CA 90406-2138. 
F.  On Experimentation in Economics 
Econometric  and  economics  texts  often 
have  a  statement  near  the  beginning  that 
experimentation is not nearly as possible  in 
economics as it  is in  the  physical  sciences. 
Perhaps  the  degree  of  difference  is  not  as 
great as many thnk. Well-designed  and ex- 
ecuted field and laboratory experiments are 
feasible  and  can  add  substantially  to  the 
body  of  knowledge  (Walter  Heller,  1975; 
Charles Plott, 1982).~~  We hope this example 
will  encourage others to ask whether an ex- 
periment  is  practical  or  feasible  when  ap- 
proachng empirical questions. 
56~or other  views  of  field  experiments  see  Jerry 
Hausman  and  David  Wlse  (1985) and  Robert  Ferber 
and Werner Hirsch (1978). 
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